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Introduction: France in a shrinking world
In 2010, France's President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a "Maison de l 'histoire de
fa France," a heritage museum, as reporters began calling it, to be opened in Paris in
2015. President Sarkozy's speechwriter on issues of national identity has cast the
museum as an answer to France's "identity crisis".' The project's aim, as President
Sarkozy has articulated it, is to "reinforce national identity," warning as well, "It is
always dangerous to forget your history.t" It is exactly this fear, the fear of forgetting
France's rich history, which has spurred controversy and upheaval within the French
republic.
The extent to which President Sarkozy's proposal has struck a nerve in the French
population is evidenced by the extensive protest against the Maison, notably from the
academic sphere. Several historians signed letters that were published in Le Monde,
speaking against this promotion of "official history" and its propagation as a political
tool. One letter points specifically to the creation and promotion of national identity as
problematic to academic historical pursuits. The letter states, "Si l'echelle privilegiee est
celle d'une France rabougrie, c'est, en consequence, moins le resultat d'une reflexion
pedagogique, savante et critique que de la mise en place d'un projet fonde sur la peur de
l'autre et que Ie pouvoir exprime dans un mouvement de repli sur soi.,,3 For the historians
who signed this letter, the national identity to be promoted by this museum would
represent less a celebration of French history and more the assertion of a French identity
1

Michale Kimmelman, "'Cultural Revolt' Over Sarkozy's Museum Plans", New York Times (9 March

2011), C 1.
2 Angelique Chrisafis, "French historians rally against Nicolas Sarkozy's 'legacy' museum" The Guardian
(10 November 2010),27.
3 "Maison de l'histoire de France est un projet dangereux," Le Mamie, October 21,2010. "If the privileged
configuration is that of a stunted France, it is, consequently, less the result of an educated, knowledgeable,
and critical reflection than of the creation of a project founded on fear of the other and that power
implements in a movement of withdrawal into the self." (My translation)
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that diminishes the multitude of different histories that compose an increasingly diverse
national identity. Addressing exactly this concern, immigrant organizations have also
staged protests throughout Paris, denouncing the propagation of an official French history
that they argue fails to incorporate their stories, often with roots in countries beyond
France, into the mosaic of French national history. The problem with the proposed
museum, from their perspectives, is the legitimization of a singular national history, one
that implies a definitive version of the history that defines France, and French citizens, in
the past and as they exist today.

The global national identity crisis
The controversy over the Maison de l 'histoire de fa France is but one facet of a
search for identity playing out throughout France and in its politics, as well as around the
world more generally. The national identity crisis evoked by Sarkozy in his defense of
the museum is one felt globally. In an ever more interconnected world, where the role of
the nation in international politics is becoming increasingly ambiguous, what it means to
be a part of a nation never strays far from world headlines. Identity politics drive current
scholarship as well as international interactions. As the issue of state sovereignty
provides an undercurrent for much of the discussion in international studies circles today,
it is worth considering to what extent the nation continues or ceases to form an important
component of personal identity.

4

The issue of identity, especially as it relates to national

identity, is further layered with historical importance; greater economic

See, for instance, Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2006). Sen
discusses the role of multiple layers of identity in much of the violence perpetrated around the world today.
This discussion is particularly important, he argues, because of the diminishing role of the nation state as a
traditional basis for identity.

4
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interconnectedness

has led to greater movement of peoples", furthering complications as

concerns national identity. We are citizens of a profoundly interconnected world, and
nationalism, though still potent, is no longer easily defined within increasingly porous
borders.
However, even as national identity is probed and stretched, the phenomenon itself
retains its political significance, notably in the example of France. France's experience
with national identity has been at once exceptional and emblematic of similar shifts
across Europe", setting the stage for change on a broader scale. There is no dearth of
evidence to illustrate how significant questions of national identity continue to be in
French politics; the struggle for national identity in France, from political platforms of
presidents to legislation of school dress code, is a pang felt in many facets of both
political and everyday life.

Foundations of the crisis: Algeria
To trace the origins of the "crisis of identity" in France, especially as it is playing
out today, it is helpful to look at the state's experience of decolonization, a history that
literally redefined France and what it means to be French. To do this, we will look at the
specific case of Algeria and the Algerian War as emblematic of the broader process of
decolonization for France.
Though France had a significant colonial presence around the world, Algeria is

William Robinson, "Globalization and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights in the United States", in
Globalization: The trans/ormation of Social Worlds, 3rd edtion, ed. Stanley Eitzen and Maxine Baca Zinn
(Belmont: Thomson, 2012), 53.
Ii An example of this is the influence of the so-called "Gayssot Law," implemented in France on 13 July
1990. It declares denying "crimes against humanity" an offense punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.
On 20 April 2007, a similar law was passed at the European level: to be discussed further later in the paper.
(Liberte pour I'Histoire. "French 'lois memorielles'").
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the logical choice for a discussion of identity in decolonization. In the mid twentieth
century, Algeria represented an achievement of international greatness to the French.
Having just lost Indochina in a brutal war, Algeria was clearly the most important colony
in the dwindling French empire. Algeria was France's greatest export market and home to
over one million French citizens. It made up a significant part of France, representing 3
departements, and was distinguished from other French colonial possessions in that the
Ministry of the Interior instead of the Ministry of Colonies administered it' The native
Algerians were not considered citizens but rather subjects, though they too made up an
important part of the French population. Many Algerians immigrated to France at the
beginning of the twentieth century to provide labor to an expanding French economy.
Between 1915 and 1918, 78,566 Algerians came into France (along with 53,755 other
North Africans)." This labor became even more necessary after the First World War and
the loss of thousands of French lives. Despite the important connections between the
Metropole and Algeria, the waves of immigration led to increasing discontent after the
First World War. Algerian soldiers returning home after the war could not have missed
the discrepancy between the opportunities available in France and the hardships faced in
its colony. Algerian nationalist movements sprang up in France and Algeria alike, and by
the end of the Second W orId War, these Algerian nationalists were calling for
independence.
The Algerian War itselflasted from 1958-1962, triggering the fall of the Fourth
Republic and the creation of the Fifth. Beginning with the official pronouncement from
Paris that French troops were being sent to fight a terrorist insurrection in the colony, the

7
8

Benjamin Stora, Algeria J 830-2000: A Short History (Comel! University Press: Ithaca 2001), 30.
Ibid, 14.
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war soon embroiled both France and Algeria in a military and political quagmire. The
war saw atrocities committed on both sides; the French used systematic torture
techniques to gain information from prisoners and the Algerian nationalists (who split
into competing factions) targeted civilians (of European descent) in highly visible, public
places to stage attacks meant to capture the world's attention. Amidst all the fighting,
however, Algeria was still considered an important part of the French empire; when thenPresident Charles De Gaulle expressed his backing of "self-determination" for Algeria in
the early 1960s, two assassination attempts were made against him, one conducted by
four of his own generals."
The war and subsequent loss of Algeria represented a rupture in national identity.
Pierre Nora, in the introduction to his extensive work Les lieux de memoire, writes that,
"the Algerian War. .. was truly our War of Secession -- a civil war and an intense crisis in
the national conscience.t'" In the aftermath of war, politically-recognized identities
changed as the Algerians lost their status as "subjects"ll in France, a complication for the
thousands of immigrants living in French cities. Furthermore, the French of Algeria -- the
pieds-noirs -- returned to France, a country some of them had never seen, as their
families had lived in Algeria for generations. Finally, the Algerians who had remained
loyal to the French and who had fought against the nationalists in the war -- known as
harkis -- faced certain death in Algeria from the newly formed government, and as many
as could get out fled to France. The face of both nations changed quickly and

9 The generals justified their plot by accusing President De Gaulle of treason in supporting the secession of
French territories.
JO Pierre Nora, Rethinking France: Les lieux de memoire, Vol. I (University of Chicago Press: Chicago,
2001), VIII.
11 As subjects, Algerians were legally permitted to be in France. In losing this status, they also lost legal

legitimation for residing in France.
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dramatically, a change with which French society continues to struggle in its quest for a
cohesive identity.

Historical disconnect
France was physically diminished following this brutal episode of decolonization;
no amount of political spin on the part of then-President Charles De Gaulle could erase
the sense that France had fallen from a place of imperial power. Algeria was the colony
most linked to France's identity in the international realm not only because of its
economic importance, but also because of the prestige that its administration leant to the
French empire. Its severance from the republic was a true loss in land, economy,
population, and the prestige that comes with the position at the head of an empire. Even
more humiliating was the fact that France had been beaten by its own colony in this bitter
war. Such a loss was a much greater blow to national pride than would be a loss to
another European country like Germany. The natives that the French missionaries had set
out to civilize over a century before had finished by brutally rejecting their political and
ideological influence. Much was lost for France in the Algerian War, and the blow it
represented to France's pride at the head of an empire was never overcome.
Furthermore, the values of the nation were thrown into question even as the war
was still raging. France was violating the very national values upon which it was built
following the revolution of 1789, which was pointed out by contemporary intellectuals,
such as Jean Paul Sartre.v' The most obvious of these values was the right to self-rule; a
concept we have seen was viewed as treasonous in the midst of the war. The republican

One example of Sartre 's response to the Algerian war can be seen in the preface he wrote to Frantz
Fanons The Wretched of the Earth, to be discussed in greater detail later.
12
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ideals so important to the creation of France as it was at the beginning of the Algerian
War were not extended to the "subjects" in Algeria whose representation in Paris was
very limited. Also foundational to the French republic as it projects its image is its status
as the nation des droits de l'homme. With the Declaration des droits de l'Homme et du
Citoyen in 1789, France cast itself as the nation defending human rights, a stance that was
profoundly violated with the authorization of torture in the Algerian War. If France could
treat its own subjects in such a way, how could the old claim to human rights be
maintained?
The historical discontinuity so starkly evidenced in the Algerian War continued
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Pierre Nora engages this concept in

/

Les lieux de memoire, in which he looks to the late 1970s and the 1980s to trace the
current wave of national identity crisis, and it is in this crisis that he finds "France in
thrall to memory": national, collective memory, dating back to the days of the
monarchy.v' It is in this setting that Nora begins his investigation into the development of
national memory in France; reconnecting with the past by reevaluating its representation
in and in connection to the present: re-imagining the possibilities of the future by
recasting the idea of France. From this perspective, the creation of national identity
through the formation, even standardization, of national memory is not a phenomenon as
old as France itself. It was born out of necessity from an identity crisis provoked by
France's changing values.
The Algerian War is an important component of this crisis, but certainly not the
only contributing factor. In Les lieux de memoire, Nora points to three distinct
phenomena in connection with the historical disconnect at the heart of the current identity
13

Ibid, X.
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crisis: the economic downturn beginning with the oil crisis of the 1970s, the move away
from agriculture in the decades after World War II, and the challenge to the revolutionary
spirit represented by the fall of the Soviet Union. These all contribute to the historical
disconnect in question and are important to Nora's purpose in Les lieux de memoire.
Though Nora has been criticized'? for not placing emphasis on the role decolonization
played in the broader historical break he addresses, it does bear consideration that it was
no one factor that led to the current identity crisis in France, but rather a perfect storm of
historical shifts. Furthermore, Nora has more recently addressed separate factors
contributing to this break, factors that fit into the puzzle of the "identity crisis" as it is
playing out on the national stage in France currently, and which will be discussed later.

History, memory, and identity
It is the issue of the idea of France as preserved in national memory that is being
touched by the present proposal for a Maison de I 'histoire de fa France. President
Sarkozy's cautioning that it is "dangerous to forget your history" is an actualized situation
in France. The history of which he is speaking, however, is not the history of the
individuals of France, but the image of France in history as foundational to the creation of
a cohesive idea of France from which to derive national identity. In fact, it is particularly
ironic that President Sarkozy should speak thusly about forgetting one's own history, as
he himself is a second-generation immigrant from Hungary

.15

His strong stance on

immigration issues first as Minister of the Interior and now as President embodies the
14See, for example: Charles Tshimanga, Didier Gondola, and Peter J. Bloom, eds, Frenchness and the
African Diaspora: Identity and Uprising in Contemporary France (Indiana University Press: Bloomington,
2009), 124.
15Sophie Pedder, "Atypically French: Sarkozy's Bid to Be a Different Kind of President" Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 86, No.3 (May - Jun, 2007),124.
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insistence of the State that the primacy of the population's identity with France be
paramount. By taking such a controversial stance, President Sarkozy presents his own
identity as first and foremost French, a move that allows him to appeal at once to the
liberal and immigrant communities as an immigrant himself as well as to the more
conservative voters who promote the absolute primacy of French citizenship in identity.
Nevertheless, as noted above, a historical disconnect makes the maintenance of such an
identity difficult.
However, just what image of France is being challenged is worth consideration.
The challenge of both an imperial image and republican ideals reveals the importance of
these factors in the example of the Algerian War. These are not the only aspects
contributing to the national memory that translates to identity: every nation forms its
identity to some extent from events or ideals that are translated into national myth. For
the United States, the "American dream," the founding fathers and the Revolutionary
War, and the promotion of democracy all act in this way. The historic reality of these
events or ideas is not as important as their contribution to how the United States'
populace understands itself as Americans; it is the fact that Americans see themselves as
the inheritors of this history that builds and maintains the national identity. France has its
own set of ideals and events that contributes to national identity. The long and glorious
history of the country from the Roman era through the monarchies as well as the
connection to the land through farming are such elements. National heroes like Joan of
Arc and traditions rooted in Catholicism (such as Mardi Gras parades or Christmas
celebrations) also contribute to the store of national memory. For France, however, the
mythic versions of these memories do not translate as easily to the current state of

10

France: the long monarchical tradition was cut by the Revolution, farmers make up a
relatively small proportion of the population today, and Catholic traditions are at odds
with the stringent form of secularism France embraces. France struggles with historic
memory and identity more than other countries because of a greater disconnect from its
long (if mythic) history as a homogeneous nation to its current reality of increasing
diversity. This diversity has come to France in the form of immigration.

Competing identities: Immigration
Immigration has been prevalent in France the length of its long history; the
difference today is that the maj ority of the immigrants are not coming from other
European countries. In 1900, 98% of immigrants to France were from Europe; in 2000,
16

that figure had dropped to 40% -- 1% less than immigrants from Africa.

The

decolonization of North Africa had profound effects on the makeup of the French
population. As noted above, many colonial subjects were living in France at the time of
decolonization as a much-needed contribution to the workforce after World War 1. Such
immigration was important to the function of the nation at that time, and was not seen as
an inundation of foreigners as immigration from the same region is seen today. 17 After
all, these immigrants were only moving between an overseas extension of the French
territory and the country over which it was already sovereign. However, with Algerian
independence, these same subjects became foreigners, politically."

16 Jonathan Laurence and Jestin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in
Contemporary France (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2006), 17.
17 Furthermore, most of the French population at the time hoped the immigrants' stay in France would be
temporary and they would eventually return to their countries of origin.
18 This political estrangement was intensified in the next decade by an economic downturn that saw an
increase in unemployment throughout France, and with it an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment.
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Furthermore, in the decade after independence, two distinct waves of immigration
from Algeria specifically and North Africa in general came to France. Immediately
following the war, the so-called harkis who were able to escape from Algeria made up
the first wave. The immigrants in this group were granted the choice of becoming French
citizens upon arrival for their loyalty and time served in the war. However, no guarantee
of citizenship could spare them from the institutional and societal obstacles that awaited
them. Institutionally, France was unprepared to accept the wave of harkis and piedsnoirs'" as they fled to the country simultaneously following the war; both these groups
faced immediate immersion into a nation many of them had never before seen. While the
pieds-noirs were aided through government-funded housing and job placement, the
harkis were placed in resettlement camps in impoverished conditions where they
effectively stayed until the mid-1970s. From a societal perspective, while the pieds-noirs
were able to integrate, to a certain extent, as French citizens who had always been
citizens, the harkis were faced with the difficult situation of integrating to the society that
had until very recently ruled over their country of origin as a colonial power. They were
racially distinct from most of the rest of the French population, and thus faced challenges
that did not hamper the pieds-noirs in the same position.
The second wave of immigration occurred over a longer timespan, though
statistically it had a greater effect on the population living in France. Immigrants
continued to move to France as a part of the labor force throughout the decade following
independence, although their numbers were greatly reduced by the French government
after the economic downturn in the early 1970s. However, the reunification of families

The pied-noirs were the French citizens (of French descent) living in Algeria at the time of independence
who fled the country en masse at the conclusion of the war.
19
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continued to contribute to the immigrant population into the early 1980s. In the late
1960s, the rate of immigration from family reunification from all countries was 55,000
per year; this number grew to 81,000 in 1973_2o
As these two important movements of immigration came to France, national
identity was challenged as the face of the nation physically altered. As national memory
and mythic history made up an important aspect of national identity, this identity was
essentially destabilized by the competing memories of immigrants: memories of their
own countries of origin as well as memories of France. Immigrants, especially
immigrants from North Africa, had memories from their own lives that challenged the
long-held historical memory that had bound the French population to its identity as a
nation. While certain groups within France were questioning the use of torture during the
Algerian War, immigrants to France after the war held their own memories or shared
memories of family or friends who experienced such torture personally, shattering their
belief in the legitimacy of France's claim of its commitment to the preservation of human
rights. Furthermore, the presence of immigrants from many former colonies served as a
reminder of history and memories most of the French population would gladly forget, a
conflict to be discussed later.

Laicite and religion
While immigration itself acted as a challenge to national identity, many of the
immigrants brought with them more than personal memories at odds with the official
memories upon which the state sought to build a cohesive history. As the immigrant

20

Laurence and Vaisse, 17.
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communities in France increased, so too did the diversity of religion in France,
particularly in the size of the Muslim population.
It is difficult to accurately state the size of the Muslim population in France
because national censuses do not ask for data on religious affiliation. This is one
manifestation of French secularism, laicite. Current estimates place the figure of Muslims
living in France between 4 and 5 million21 By all estimates, though, Islam is the second
largest religion in France, behind Catholicism, a statistic declared by both Islamic
advocacy groups wishing to emphasize the size of the group they represent as well as
alarmists looking to incite concern over this growing demographic. The growth of Islam
is due in great part to immigration after decolonization, yet it is nevertheless incorrect to
conceive of the Muslim population in France as a homogeneous group. Country of origin,
language, strictness of adherence to Islamic principles, and depth of personal
identification with their religion are just some of the manners in which this group is
diverse. However, two characteristics common to most of this population are their
geographic location and their marginalization by much of French society.
Geographically, most of the Muslim population in France is located within large cities or
in their banlieues: Paris is home to thirty-five to forty percent of all Muslims with another
fifteen to twenty percent living around Marseille and Nice.22 Muslims are more likely to
suffer discrimination and unemployment, two factors that contributed to riots in the
banlieues of Paris in 2005, to be discussed in the next section.
The challenge religious diversity presents to France's national identity as it is
formed through historical memory directly relates to the tension formed between strict

21

Ibid, 19.

22

Ibid, 22.
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French secularism and lingering Catholic national traditions. The French republic is
secular by law; as much is said in the first section of the French constitution. Unlike in
the United States, there is no serious discussion of the viability of prayer in schools or
decoration of government buildings with depictions of the Ten Commandments.
However, this has certainly not been the case throughout all of French national history; in
fact, for much more of its history than it was secular, France's government was
intrinsically connected to religious authority. Throughout the history of the monarchy in
France, steps towards religious tolerance were exceptional events. France, as a nation,
was uninterruptedly Catholic until the revolution of 1789_23 Even then, lasting laws of
separation between church and school would not be enacted until the tum of the twentieth
century with Jules Ferry and his laws. Though France is doggedly secular today, such
determined secularism is a relatively new development.
Nevertheless, Catholic tradition survives and thrives in France, and even has
limited governmental manifestations. As relates to schools, French public (thus secular)
schools have breaks scheduled to accommodate Christian holidays such as Christmas and
Easter. Having a shortened day one day of the week (usually Wednesday) is a vestige of a
law allowing Catholic children to attend catechism classes. Catholicism has historical
roots in France that are old and deep enough to continue despite a fierce turn to secular
ideals. Such roots form an important part of French memory and identity, down even to
its architecture. Some of the most visited sites in France (which is the nation that receives
the greatest number of tourists in the world) are religious in nature, especially old
cathedrals such as Notre Dame de Paris. In fact, Catholic churches constructed before

Though the Edict of Nantes in the sixteenth century provided one of the exceptional eras of relative
religious tolerance, the country remained overwhelmingly Catholic.

23
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1906 are supported with government funds that provide for the upkeep of the buildings
themselves.
The justification for such an allocation of financial responsibility comes from a
law enacted in 1906 and the Catholic backlash that ensued thereafter. In 1906, a law was
passed declaring that the state would neither recognize nor allocate funds to any religion.
This meant churches that had been paid for by the state had to be paid for by
congregations or be confiscated. Catholic congregations, with the backing of Pope Pius
X, refused to comply and staged widespread protests throughout France when police
attempted to take possession of the buildings by force. The government relented with a
compromise stipulating that Catholic congregations would pay rent to the state for use of
their buildings, though this payment has become almost completely symbolic over the
years. Because this law applied only to religious buildings in buil t before 1906, no
mosques could benefit from the same support, as no mosques existed in France at the
time_24Catholicism maintains a place of privilege in France simply because it plays such
an important role in national history, memory, and identity. However, with an
increasingly diverse population, the Catholic shared identity comes under pressure both
from the rise of a competing religious identity -- Islam -- and the push towards secular
identification that has resurged with new force in light of the rise ofIslam. As the
republican ideal of secularism is continuously invoked in issues ofIslamic religious
manifestations, the exception Catholicism has enjoyed within the republic comes under
closer scrutiny and its status in the formation of national identity becomes increasingly
untenable.

24 Even Protestant and Jewish places of worship are denied the same arrangement as the Catholics because
neither the Protestant nor the Jewish congregations staged protests with as much force as did the Catholics.
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Race and racism in France
Just as religious diversity has been brought to France with immigration, so too has
racial diversity, and racial tensions and prejudices make up an important part of the
current identity crisis in France. In fact, the thrust of immigration issues in France
currently is distinct from questions of mere legality of population movement across
borders: the issue is layered with racial identities and prejudices. In 2000, 41% of
foreigners living in metropolitan France were of African origin. Another 40% were of
European origin."
The importance of these two groups, however, is not how they are similar (in
proportion and status as immigrants) but rather how they are different, and their paths
towards integration into French society are tellingly dissimilar. In considering issues of
identity, especially national identity, we must consider not only in what manner identity
is positively formed, such as in fostering a sense of community around certain events or
values, but also how identity is negatively formed in contrast to what is not acceptable.
This second identity is an identity formed in contrast to an "other" in society, one whose
existence beyond the limits of a society's identity indicates exactly where those limits lie.
The French identity is made evident by defining what is not French, and those who fit
into this identity are necessarily not part of this "other". In France, race makes up an
important component of this second, negative identity. The non-European immigrant
population in France forms an other to the European immigrants, a demographic that is
therefore more easily accepted into French society and identity. Jonathan Laurence and
Justin Vaisse address the difference in integration between European immigrants and
North African immigrants stating that the former, "encounters strong and even violent
25

integrating islam, J 7.
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resistance from 'native' ... residents ... before, despite such protestations, eventually being
successfully integrated.t' " This treatment they contrast with, "Recent immigrants from
North Africa [who] are facing the same challenges as previous immigrants, except that
they tend to accumulate even more negative points with respect to acceptance by French
society.

,,27

The non-European immigrants are even more foreign in France, and thus

integrate with the French with even more difficulty.
The issue of racism in France came to a boiling point in 2005 with riots in the
banlieues of Paris. The riots began in October after two teenagers of North African origin
died in their attempts to escape police in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. In the
three weeks that followed, riots erupted in nearly all major cities in France. The conflict
was waged between disenfranchised young immigrants in the suburbs and the police
whom the youth accused of discriminatory brutality against young immigrants. The riots
marked a period of unrest unseen in France since the 1960s. On November 8, a state of
emergency was declared by the French government, invoking a law from 1955 used to
quell unrest in France during the Algerian War. In its first manifestation, the law gave
police authority to suppress demonstrations by Algerian nationals and ultimately served
28

as justification for the deadly suppression of Algerian nationals in Paris in 1961.

The

2005 unrest garnered international attention, and sparked the resurgence of the
"immigrant question" as a pivotal political position. Nicolas Sarkozy, then-Minister of
the Interior, famously called the youth involved in the I;OtS"rabble", and the incidents
were construed as an issue of upset caused by illegal residents followed by a cry from the

26
27

Ibid, 49.
Ibid, 49.

28 Charles Tshimanga, Didier Gondola, and Peter .T. Bloom, eds., Frenchness and the African Diaspora:
Identity and Uprising in Contemporary France (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2009), 5.
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political right for their expulsion from France. The discontent of the rioting youth was
certainly grounded in high rates of poverty and unemployment, but it is the source of both
those conditions that really speaks to the issues of identi ty manifested in the 2005 riots.
As Joan Scott argues, "The riots in the fall of 2005 revealed the enormous discrepancy
between the lives of 'immigrants' and 'French,' ... And the response of the government
officials ... signals once again a refusal to face the fact that this is a French problem. It is,
moreover, a postcolonial French problem, not a foreign import."

29

These riots revealed

the continuation of the old problem of integration as well as the contradiction inherent in
its administration: even as the State demanded integration from its immigrant populace, it
persisted in marginalizing members of the same population. The riots of 2005 stand as a
symbol of the failure of integration in the French population, and this failure is a further
manifestation of the French "crisis of identityv"

Mending the disconnect: Creating an official history
As immigrant issues present challenges to French identity, the historical
disconnect described by Nora becomes evermore prevalent, a situation evidenced in the
passage oflegislation that effectively seeks to control history as it is studied and
understood within France. The proposed Maison de l'histoire de fa France seeks to
establish an official version of France's history and the nation's place in a broader
historical context. Its purpose is to promote a particular historical tradition and thus ease
the disconnect described above. This proposal, however, is preceded by legislation that
criminalizes certain histories, making them wholly unaccepted and unacceptable within
Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of/he Veil (Princeton University Press: Princeton 2007),180.
30 An artistic rendering of the tension between immigrant youth in the banlieues and French police is the
subject of Mathieu Kaswsovitzs film La Haine, produced in 1995.
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France. The aim here is to disallow certain histories. Though this construction is certainly
not limited to France, laws concerning the criminalization of denying official histories
point to history in France as a more highly contested and regulated topic than elsewhere
in the world. Such regulations can be seen in the 1990 law criminalizing the denial of
crimes against humanity as defined in article 9 of the London Agreement from 1945.
Further legislation was passed in 2001 recognizing the Armenian genocide of 1915 and
defining the slave trade and slavery as practiced in the 15th century to be crimes against
humanity.
In one of three "fundamental texts" for Liberte pour I 'histoire (an association
created under the signatures of one thousand historians in response to the aforementioned
laws), Pierre Nora stands firmly opposed to the "memory laws" of the past two decades,
declaring them symptomatic of a broader "guilty conscience" from which the world,
especially France, suffers. His contribution to the association's manifesto reiterates the
position that "history is neither a religion nor a moral doctrine; that it should not be a
slave to current affairs, nor dictated by memory.?" Such strong reactions against laws as
innocuous as those affirming the existence of crimes against humanity is certainly
symptomatic of more complicated issues in French politics, from Nora's perspective.
While he argues in this forum against reconstructing history as penance for past crimes,
Nora is immovable in his quest to liberate historical inquiry from political interference.
France, he says, is particularly susceptible to such traps. He states:
After the upheavals of the last century, every country has scores to settle with its
past. None is more ill at ease with its history than France; this is one of the most
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obvious symptoms and one of the underlying causes of our current national
malaise. No other country has so deeply internalized the shock of historical
memory, which has affected the whole world over the last thirty years, as to feel
that its own historical identity is undermined.f
France, then, is at once particular and representative of issues of national identity in other
countries. As Nora states later in the same piece, France's "shock of historical memory"
comes from the nation's experience as the antagonist of history, especially after World
War II and the Vichy regime and then decolonization, with specific reference to the
Algerian War. Yet Nora construes this guilty reexamination, too, as a manipulation of
history to serve political purposes, an official mea culpa in the face of tensions in an
increasingly multicultural country. Jean-Paul Sartre addressed this "very Christian
sentiment of guilt" in his preface to Frantz Fanon's The Wrethched of the Earth. Speaking
of Europe in the age of decolonization, Sartre states, "l'on ne pretend plus nous sauver du
naufrage que par le sentiment tres chretien de notre culpabilite ... Que s'est-il done passe?
Ceci, tout simplement, que nous etions les sujets de l'histoire et que nous en sommes

a

present les objets. ,,33 The laws concerning official history, however, do not fall merely on
the side of the victim, as Nora observes.
A law passed in 2005, but since revised, addresses France's colonial past in a
manner unlike the "memory laws" before it. It first recognizes the "positive" influence
French colonial presence had in North Africa and mandates that ,"Les programmes
scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le role positif de la presence francaise outre-mer,
Pierre Nora, "Historical Identity in Trouble" Liberte pourL'histoire (CNRS Editions, 2(08).
Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to The Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon, trans. Constance Farrington
(New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963) 27. "The only chance of our being saved from shipwreck is the very
Christian sentiment of guilt.. What then has happened? It simply is that in the past we made history and
now it is being made of us."

32
33

21

'---__

notamment en Afrique du Nord, et accordent it l'histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants
de l'armee francaise issus de ces territoires la place eminente it laquelle ils ont droit.,,34
This certainly falls under the instances of official history with which Nora is concerned,
but decidedly not under the category of history for the victims. Nora's expressed worry is
that history will be diminished to memory in France, and used to construct a regulated
image of the France of bygone eras; unfortunately, he agrees, it has already become an
important component of national memory and informs national identity even as the
"crisis" continues. Memory cannot be extracted from French identity as it is currently
expressed.

National memory to nationally forgotten
Equally important to the discussion of national identity is not only what histories
are celebrated but those that are forgotten. As Robert Aldrich states in his investigation of
monuments to the colonial era in France, "Memories can be kept alive, forgotten or
repressed, acknowledged or reconstructed.
remembering/forgetting

,,35

It is the second half of the

dichotomy that is important here. The drive to "official history"

described above outlines the manner in which the state wishes to control how certain
events are remembered. Equally important in this formulation is the manners of
remembering these particular events that are not condoned, and thus necessarily
repressed, by the state through these same laws.

34 LOl n° 2005-158 du 23 fevrier 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en
faveur des Francais rapatries (I) "Scholarly programs specifically recognize the positive role of France's
presence in its colonies, particularly in North Africa, and grant the soldiers of the French army their stories
and their sacrifices the eminent position they deserve." My translation
35 Robert Aldrich, Vestiges of Colonial Empire in France: Monuments, Museums, and Colonial Memories
(Palgrave Macmillan: Gordonsville, 2005), 6.
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There are certain events in France's history unacknowledged by much of France's
"official" history. The period of decolonization, especially as concems the war in Algeria,
largely falls under this selective amnesia. Relatively recent instances of more open and
official commemorations of conflicts in North Africa reveal their absence since the end
of the conflicts. It was not until 1999 that the Algerian War was officially considered a
war." In 2001, then-President Jacques Chirac unveiled two plaques pertaining to the
Algerian War and, significantly, to the experience of certain groups of Algerians during
the conflict. One was to the harkis for their contribution to the French effort in the war. In
a far more controversial move, the second plaque was dedicated to the Algerians killed
by French police in a 1961 protest in Paris against the Algerian War. A year later, a
monument was dedicated to those who died in the wars in North Africa, specifically
Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco." Despite these developments, the Algerian War and
colonial history more broadly are pointedly glossed over in expressions of France's
"official" history. In a telling contrast to the proposed Maison de l'histoire de fa France,
discussions of a museum to colonial history begun two decades ago have yet to produce
such a site.
Though scholarship regarding France's colonial history has seen a resurgence in
recent years, particularly as we approach the 50th anniversary of the end of the Algerian
War this year, the discussion of the place of colonial history in France's broader historical
memory is certainly not restricted to the academic sphere. Historical memory, especially
selective historical memory, has been and continues to be a highly politicized issue in
France, and the oscillation of public opinion is continually reflected in election results, a
36
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topic to be further explored in the next section. In his hopeful conclusion to his work on
sites of colonial memory in France, Aldrich posits, "Perhaps the sites that refer to
France's links with the rest of the world can now playa part not only in the
comprehension of the past and reconciliation of diverse groups who have carried a
colonial legacy into the present day, but also in the articulation of a political, social and
cultural vision for a post-colonial future. ,,38

Nationalism

politicized

Just as historical memory has been extensively addressed in legislation, so too has
it become an oft-debated issue in political battles. As a means of courting popular public
opinion, issues relating to the colonial experience and its vestiges in France today are
regularly invoked and spun into crucial elements of the platforms of political parties.
While most political parties include some stance on issues like immigration in their
official platforms, none has structured their party's philosophy so concretely around this
issue more than the extreme right nationalist party, the Front National. In the actions and
successes of this party, the story of immigration legislation and public opinion finds a
particularly dramatic telling.
The Front National has made headlines throughout its almost fifty years of
existence both for surprising support during elections and for the personalities within the
party and the negative attention they garner. The founder of the Front National, JeanMarie Le Pen, is infamous for his racist and inflammatory remarks for which he has been
prosecuted more than once. His political platform, and now the platform of his daughter,
Marine Le Pen, who has succeeded him at the head of the party, concerns national
38
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identity, targeting immigration especially. The Front National falls to the extreme right in
France's political spectrum, but it has gained remarkable support in certain elections,
most recently in the 2011. Not only does the popularity of the nationalist party serve as a
barometer of the population's position regarding immigration, it also influences how
more moderate parties conduct their campaigns. After the Front National gained almost
20% of the vote in 2011 elections, President Nicolas Sarkozy's own party sought to
throw in support with the Front National as a means to bolster his campaign for
presidential elections this year. Though President Sarkozy's decision met with
opposition, most notably from his own Prime Minister, it is illustrative of more general
tendencies in France's political environment. In fact, as the presidential elections for this
year draw closer, President Sarkozy has attempted to court the conservative vote by
playing to issues of identity and immigration. In March of this year, President Sarkozy
declared that "II y a trop d'etrangers sur notre territoire" and that methods of assimilation
were working more and more poorly. He vowed to cut annual immigration by almost half
and make certain social benefits unavailable to immigrants except those who had lived in
France for at least ten years and worked there at least five_39This strategy harmonizes
with the political platform of the Front National and Marine Le Pen who is also a
presidential candidate this year. Though the Front National is still considered an
extremist group in France, it has also recently been seen as increasingly representative of
the population's position, especially its insecurities and frustrations regarding
immigration. This is especially true in large cities and in the south of France where large
immigrant populations reside.

39 Elise Vincent,

"linmigmtim: Smkazych.ucitJetol1" LeMorde (7Mach Xl12).
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Identity in the classroom: The headscarf controversies
On September 14, 1989, three girls were expelled from a public middle school in
France for refusing to remove their hijab in the classroom. Thus began l'affaire du
foulard, a political debate that engulfed France, putting a specific face to the growing
tension between Islamic traditions and French secular practices. Thefoulard, or veil, was
construed as having a number of symbolic meanings and intentions. It was seen as a
rejection of French secularism and, thus, French republican values. The girls who wore it
were construed as threats to the sanctity of the secular schoolroom and victims of the
oppressive religion that stripped them of their agency to refuse the garment. It was widely
considered that male relatives were forcing the girls to wear the veil against their will.
Furthermore, the veil was viewed as a means of concealing one's identity, especially
troublesome in a post-9111 world, where terrorism was a very real concern for much of
the West.40 Above all, the veil symbolized foreignness and the unknown, which separated
certain members of the population from the group of citizens meant to be identical in the
eyes of the State. It therefore also represented a blow to the concept of French
universalism.
The foreignness of the veil was not soon eradicated, despite the longevity of the
affaire. The controversy has endured through the 1990s into the new millennium when
then-President Jacques Chirac created a specific commission -- known as the Stasi
Commission -- in 2003 to "Reflect on the Application of Secularism" (the commission's
official title). After the recommendations of the Stasi Commission, a law was enacted in
March 2004 banning students from wearing "conspicuous" signs of religious affiliation in

40 "Terrorist" provided another umbrella classification for the Arab population of France (as well as many
other European countries).
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public schools." Though the law applies to all religious symbols, it has been widely seen
as a means of controlling public manifestations of a growing Muslim community and
their adherence to Islamic traditions. This controversy is interesting here for two
particular reasons. First, the 2004 law is another area in which legislation effectively
controls how religion is displayed within France, a struggle renewed in the face of
increasing immigration from North Africa, as noted above. Secondly, that this law targets
schools particularly allows a glimpse into the importance of schools in maintaining
national identity by educating children to become good citizens. This second reason
merits further exploration.
As with so much else in the formation of French identity, the role the public
school plays is important in many nations, but it is in France that the public school forms
a crucial component. As Bronwyn Winter argues, "More than in many other countries,
the education system in France is the place where national identity and the individual's

...____

sense of herself or himself as a citizen is forged. It is the place where the battle for the
Republic has always been waged, on several fronts. ,,42 This returns to collective memory
in France that goes back to the Revolution and follows the story of the painful extrication
of the Church from the State, officially accomplished in 1905. As the republicans
restructured society into its new democratic shape, education provided a systematic
medium for molding young minds into the desired, republican shape. These children
would grow up in the new republican fundamentals of French society, developed through
an institution systematically monitored by the State. The public school was a tool for
building a new nation, and national identity, from the children up. Joan Scott describes
41 Bronwyn Winter, Hijab and The Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate (Syracuse
University Press: Syracuse, 2008), 6-7.
42 Ibid 8.
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public schools in France as, "the sacred space of the schoolroom, the crucible in which
French citizens are formed.

,,43

It is, thus, particularly poignant that the controversy over

displays of religious affiliation, especially affiliation to Islam, was "waged" in the "sacred
space" of public schools. The importance of the space of public schools is important to
the overall discussion of the veil controversy because it provides insight into one facet of
how national identity is formed, maintained, and challenged. To construe the legislation
against conspicuous religious symbols in schools as one of innumerable small acts of
rejecting foreign influence is to miss the real and symbolic importance of the role of
secular education in the formation of French identity.
L 'affaire du foulard is symbolic of much of the French "crisis of identity" as it has
thus far been discussed. In one aspect, it is a symptom of former colonization. The
portrayal of the girls involved as being forced to wear the veil by controlling male
relatives casts them as victims for the Republic to save: a renewal of the call to action of
the civilizing mission that served as a justification for colonialism. This idea pits the
liberating, republican, French ideal of secularism against the oppressive, dogmatic,
foreign control ofIslam, reinforcing the idea that Islam is simply incompatible with
French republican ideals. In this way, the law allowed the State not only to "liberate" the
girls from the veil, but also to eliminate this symbol of Islam from the French public eye.
As Joan Scott states, "Here was the paradox of the civilizing mission, and it persists to
this day: the stated goal was to civilize (to assimilate) those who finally could not be
civilized.
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This hints at one reason the headscarf affair became so important in France:

the demographic connection between a large portion of France's recent immigrant
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population and mueh of France's Muslim population allowed this latter characteristic to
serve as justification for ostracism of the immigrant population as a whole. By conflating
the Muslim, Arab, and immigrant populations in France, politicians were able to
extrapolate from the headsearf affair to reject resistance to assimilation in all of these
groups. It was decided that headscarves could not be worn in public schools: latcite
legally won out over what was perceived as oppressive Islamic requirements. With this
reaffirmation of the primacy of French republican values, demands for assimilation were
renewed, a demand used today as a political tool.

Continuing the affair: Face coverings in public
The public school was not to be the only stage upon which the issue of women
wearing veils would be fought. A law passed in October of 2010 but put into effect in
April 2011 prohibits everyone in a public space in France or in French territories from
covering his or her face to the point of obstructing recognition. The reasoning behind the
ban invokes another founding republican ideal in France: equality. Equality is trespassed
upon in covering the face beyond recognition, the reasoning goes, because it is by seeing
the faces of others and showing one's own face that one takes part in society. Thus, to
cover your face in public prohibits you from equally taking part in French society as well
as it prevents others from seeing you, creating inequality between you and those who
cannot see you. Furthermore, equality is hindered when certain members of the
population are prohibited from showing their faces, as when someone is forced to wear a
face covering. In fact, Article 3 of the law outlines the punishment for those found to
have forced others to cover their faces in public, with a higher fine for forcing such an
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activity onto a minor. Indeed, the punishment for violating the law as the perpetrator is
revealing in itself: either the violator must pay a fine, or complete a course on citizenship.
The law applies to everyone in France: citizens and foreigners alike. With this, all public
spaces in France take on a similar role as the "sacred space" of the schoolroom in forming
good, republican citizens, and visitors. Furthermore, the law targets the face coverings
worn by Muslim women more explicitly by singling out the oppressive males who are
perceived to force the coverings on women. There are, however, a few notable exceptions
to the ban, including wearing helmets on motorcycles, construction workers wearing
helmets, and "en cas de ... fetes ou de manifestations artistiques ou traditionnelles,
processions religieuses notamment.

,,45

The only religious manifestations in France that

truly reflect French traditions are Catholic, not Muslim. The text of the law makes clear
its aim to protect French traditions and thus maintain those celebrations in the collective
memory that shapes French identity. It further makes clear its refusal to accept Islam into
those traditions.

France as European synecdoche
As mentioned near the beginning of this paper, France is not the only country
experiencing a sort of "identity crisis" in the twenty-first century. Throughout Europe,
similar struggles play out in the search to establish identity as increasing diversity, as
well as the diminishment of national sovereignty challenges the role of the nation. France
is particular amongst this group in that it is the country experiencing an identity crisis in
perhaps the most overt fashion. France has the largest immigrant population in Western
Pauline Freour, "Voile, signes religieux: ce qui est interdit en France" Le Figaro (8 April 20 II). "in the
case of celebrations or demonstrations of artistic or traditional nature, notably religious processions." (my
translation)
45

30

Europe, including both the largest Muslim and Jewish populations. The Front National in
France acts as more than a small, if persistent, voice on the margins of the political
spectrum. France's rupture with the past, epitomized in the French Revolution but
continued into the twentieth century, falls particularly heavily on the national
consciousness. For all the factors explored above, the identity crisis in France affects the
population and its self-perception with particular force. However, the identity crisis in a
European context merits further discussion.
The European example is bound together by a common threat to national
sovereignty and, consepuently, national identity: namely, membership in or influence of
the European Union. As Seyla Benbabib argues, membership in the European Union
represents more than mere economic or even political ties: "It is intended to designate not
just a passive status, but an active civic identity.T" She continues by outlining the porous
nature of national borders to those states within the European Union as well as how
immigrants within the EU can exercise political influence by voting and running for
office in local elections. Furthermore, debates are being held throughout Europe
concerning whether or not the EU should create a set of social rights guaranteed to
citizens of the Union. Clearly, the supranational power wielded by the European Union
has replaced or challenged decisions and policies traditionally made on the national level.
The role of the nation in Europe (and around the world, for that matter) is not only
being challenged by the existence of international organizations such as the European
Union. Beyond the reaches of such organizations, globalization has taken an increasing
toll on national identities as it challenges not only economic and political boundaries, but

46 Seyia Benbabib, "Citizens, Residents, and Aliens" in The Pas/national Self, Ulf Hedetoft and Mette
Hjort, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 92.
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cultural boundaries as well, The ever-increasing rate of cultural exchange between
societies that has been facilitated by the forces of globalization (such as global
capitalism) makes the boundaries of those societies more porous and less-easily defined.
In his discussion "The Paradox of Nationalism", Mark Juergensmeyer posits: "[The
globalization of culture] has undermined the modern idea of the nation-state by providing
nonnational and transnational forms of economic, social, and cultural interaction ... In a
global world, it is hard to say where particular regions begin and end. For that matter, it is
hard to say how one should define the 'people' of a particular nation. ,,47 He goes on to
argue that ethnic and religious identities have come to prominence as the decline in the
importance of national identity leaves people with a sense of placelessness and loss of the
power one derives from being a part of a group. Because of this, ethnic and religious
tensions and violence have become increasingly prevalent around the world.
Understanding that the place of national identity is slipping in nations throughout
Europe and around the world, there emerges a global identity crisis. Therefore, the
identity crisis experienced in France is a crisis not bound to national borders in any
particular sense. What makes the crisis in France exceptional is the manner in which
politicians have situated it within national boundaries to be dealt with as a nation. The
French identity crisis is actively made to be French as a means of maintaining a sense of
national cohesiveness even if that cohesion comes from a shared experience of crisis. The
French experience identity differently from the rest of the world because they actively
strive to do so.

Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Paradox of Nationalism" The Postnational SeU; U1f Hedetoft and Mette
Hjort, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 8.
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Conclusion
As the presidential elections draw near, the identity crisis evoked by President
Sarkozy in his proposal for the Maison de l'Histoire de la France imbues much political
debate. However, beyond the realm of new political promises and positioning, the French
are experiencing a crisis of identity in very real episodes, particularly violent episodes.
Recently, in southwest France, seven people were killed in a weeklong shooting spree
committed in three bursts by 23-year-old Mohamend Merah. The first two attacks
targeted French military personnel, all three of whom were North African in ethnic
origin. The third attack occurred outside a Jewish school in Toulouse where the shooter
killed three children and one teacher at point-blank range. After a manhunt that mobilized
all of French society, and a 32 hour siege which finally ended in the confession and death
of the attacker, France was left reeling in the wake of such violence. Merah has been
portrayed in international news coverage as having ties to al-Qaeda. He claimed to be
acting in reprisal for Palestinian children (in the attacks on the Jewish school) and in
protest of the French military presence in Afghanistan. The presidential hopefuls
suspended their campaigns for a few days in the midst of the crisis, and all attended the
funerals of the fallen soldiers." In the days following the school shooting, President
Sarkozy called for the French people to remain united and refrain from extrapolating the
actions of one man to represent the whole of the Muslim population in France. Time will
tell how this tragedy will weave into the French consciousness of identity. Most
immediately, the next two months will reveal how this episode, and the political reaction
to it, will affect this year's presidential campaign. Though the shooter's motivations were
not overtly caused by the French identity crisis, it is safe to say that many factors
48
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addressed above contribute to the environment in which these attacks were perpetrated
and in which the public reaction will play out.
Episodes of national identity crises continue to erupt in violence around the
world. International headlines will continue to draw attention to an increasingly fractured
world as societies and individuals adjust to the interpenetration of cultures through
globalization. The prominence of international organizations such as the European Union
and the United Nations is unlikely to diminish in any substantial fashion in the coming
years, allowing the further erosion of national sovereignty and, accordingly, national
identity. However, this situation does not necessarily have to yield a world rocked by
violence attached to identity politics. The diminishing role of the nation-state opens up
the opportunity, and need, for other forms of identity and understanding of the world.
Instead of allowing such a role to be taken by divisive religious and ethnic factions, this
situation could be seized by forces of increasing acceptance based on a sense of shared
humanity. The solution to the issues outlined above can be derived from the discussion of
the problem. Mark Juergensmeyer writes, "Secular nationalism -- the ideology that
originally gave the nation-state its legitimacy -- contends that a nation's authority is based
on the secular idea of a social compact of equals ... a compelling idea, one with pretension
of universal applicability.r'" As nationalism loses its foundation (the primacy of the
nation), the world opens itself to the possibility of a much broader social contract and,
therefore, even greater acceptance of individual identity. The French, European, and
global identity crises, thus, could be paths to greater acceptance, if only we decide to
forge them that way.
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